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ABSTRACT
Governments have advanced the argument that asylum-seekers may be detained
in order to deter other would-be asylum-seekers from coming. But in recent litigation
in the United States and Israel, this justification for mass detention has been met with
significant resistance from courts. This Article looks at the way American and Israeli
courts have dealt with the proposed deterrence rationale for asylum-seeker detention.
It suggests that general deterrence raises three sequential questions:

*
Michael Kagan (B.A. Northwestern, J.D. Michigan) is Professor at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. The research underlying this Article was closed in June 2015.
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1. Is deterrence ever legitimate as a stand-alone justification for depriving people
of liberty?
2. If deterrence is sometimes legitimate, is it valid as a general matter in migration
control, or is it limited to certain exceptional circumstances?
3. If deterrence is a legitimate goal, is there any effective proportionality limit on
the measures a government may take against asylum-seekers?
The American and Israeli courts did not answer these questions in the same way,
and they did not foreclose all potential future uses of deterrence by their respective
governments. But they signaled considerable judicial resistance, which may make it
more difficult for governments to justify mass detention in the future.
INTRODUCTION
International refugee law is built on a paradox. The premise of refugee law is
that people fleeing persecution should be protected. But refugee law might not be
necessary if sovereign States did not insist on tightly regulating migration. The very
idea that people fleeing persecution deserve asylum exists in perpetual tension with
the prevailing inclination to exclude foreigners. That is, if governments did not control
entry - and thus exclude or deport those who enter without permission - there would
be little need to formally define refugees as a class of people for whom an exception
should be made.' As Professor James C. Hathaway wrote, the principle that refugees
should be protected even if they enter without authorization may be the "most
important innovation" of modern refugee law.2 The clash between these impulses
fuels many of the great controversies in international refugee law.
Often, this clash is expressed through a struggle to maintain the distinction
between refugees and other would-be immigrants.' But in other contexts, this clash is
expressed more bluntly, and paradoxically, through a government stating openly that
it does not want refugees and asylum-seekers to come, even as it grudgingly concedes
that genuine refugees who arrive should not be deported. This Article examines the
efforts of two governments - those of the United States and Israel - that have recently
adopted this position in response to an influx of unwanted asylum-seekers. Both
governments adopted a policy of mass detention of people with strong asylum claims,
explicitly for the purpose of deterring other asylum-seekers from coming. In both
countries, the governments have attempted to strengthen their deterrence arguments
by linking the influx of asylum-seekers to grave concerns for national security.
My focus here will be on how the judiciaries have responded to these arguments.
Israel and the United States are quite differently situated in some respects with regard
to asylum-seekers. Although the numbers of arrivals have been comparable in gross

1. See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James C. Hathaway, Non-Refoulement in a World of
Cooperate Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, 236-242 (2015) (describing western states'
"schizophrenic posture" with regard to entry of refugees).
2.
See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 386 (2005)
(calling this principle the most important innovation of the 1951 Refugee Convention).
3.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees' Plan of Action for preserving refugee protection in the
context of so-called "mixed migration" is an example of such an effort. See generally REFUGEE
PROTECTION AND MIXED MIGRATION:

THE 10-PoINT PLAN IN AcrION, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR

REFUGEES (2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4d52864b9.html.
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scale, Israel is a considerably smaller country, which may enhance a sense of being
overrun or besieged by migrants. Perhaps more importantly, the United States has
one of the best-established asylum systems in the world. Israel, by contrast, has
resisted efforts to grant durable rights to non-Jewish refugees and has not set up a
reliable administrative apparatus to fairly process their claims.4 But in both countries,
the arrival of large numbers of asyluim-seekeis triggered an alarmist response fioiu
leading politicians, who established draconian policies to detain many of them.' And
in both countries the judiciaries resisted mass-detention policies and treated the
governments' deterrence justification with considerable skepticism.
I begin in Part I, by outlining the importance of detention and deterrence in
global refugee policy. Part II sets out in brief terms why deterrence poses a conceptual
challenge to migrant rights. Part III discusses the way American courts have dealt with
the government's recent invocation of deterrence to justify asylum-seeker detention.
Part IV discusses two high profile Israeli High Court cases that have grappled with the
analogous problem. I conclude by pointing to potential legal questions that may
emerge after these cases. Readers should note that the discussion reflects case law at
time of writing, in June 2015. My primary goal is to identify the fundamental legal
dilemmas inherent in deterrent policies, rather than to provide an up-to-date synopsis
of the state of the law.

I.

DETENTION AND DETERRENCE OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS

Detention of migrants is a widespread challenge to human rights law because it
is widely used by States and poses a conflict between the individual right to liberty and
the sovereign right to control borders.! In some cases, the concern is simply about the
conditions of detention. For example, a recent report found that in North African
countries asylum-seekers are detained in conditions that are "often horrific and
inhumane."' But there is also concern that governments are turning increasingly to
incarceration to enforce migration law, and are criminalizing the act of migration in
the process.'

&

4. See Edward N. Krakaucr, Divergent Paths, Similar Results: How African Asylum Seekers Have
Been Failed in Both Israel and Malta Despite Varying Procedures and Treatment, 21 U. MIAMI INT'L
COMp. L. REV. 265, 273 91 (2013) (summarizing the development and weakneses of the Irraeli asylum
system).
5. See id. at 274-79 (summarizing legislation passed by the Knesset in response to increased
immigration); Faiza W. Sayed, Note, ChallengingDetention: Why ImmigrantDetaineesReceive Less Process
Than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1836-41 (2011)
(describing the U.S. government's current treatment of asylum-seekers).
6. See Cathryn Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention
Under InternationalHuman Rights andEU Law, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257,258-59 (2012) ("The
state's migration control powers seem to be given greater sway than others, reflecting an uneasy tension
between the universal right to liberty and the state's border control prerogatives.").
GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
7.
REGION
2 (2015),
http//www.globaldotentionprojoct.org/filoadmin/DIVERSE/GDPMled-report
final.pdf.
See generally David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51
8.
EMORY L.J. 1003 (2002); Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory ImmigrationDetention,
45 I-ktny. C.R. C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010); C6sar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia Hernindez, Immigration Detention as
Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM.
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Beyond these general concerns, there is something especially challenging about
the basic concept of detention of asylum-scekers, over and above the concerns that
miay be raised in reference to detention of any migrant. As other writers have noted,
there is something contradictory at the heart of any policy calling for the detention of
asylum-seekers, since it means that people seeking refuge from persecution are
welcomed first by being locked up.9 Nevertheless, many governments have longeslablished policies for delaininig asylum-seekers who arrive iniivited)0 Australia, for
instance, began a system of mandatory detention for asylum-seekers who arrive
spontaneously in 1989."
Mandatory detention of asylum-seekers caught at the border can be mitigated at
least somewhat by the opportunity for an individual review. For example, in the
United States, the normal system is for asylum-seekers to be detained when they arrive
without travel documents, but to then be released if they establish a "credible fear" of
persecution. 12 In the United States, the credible fear interview is an interim procedure
designed to weed out baseless and clearly fraudulent claims, and is used with reference
to migrants who otherwise would be subject to expedited removal." Such procedures
are ostensibly targeted against abuse of the asylum systen, not against asylum-seekers
with valid refugee claims, and thus raise deterrence in a somewhat different context.
Many questions about detention relate to migrants who are found to have invalid
asylum claims or who may not even be asylum-seekers. There is considerable
international case law holding that a State cannot detain migrants in absence of
deportation proceedings. 4 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court found that
indefinite detention would pose a constitutional problem, even for deportable noncitizens with serious criminal records." By contrast, in what may be an outlying
decision, a divided Australia High Court affirmed indefinite detention in Al-Kateb v.

L. PEV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010); Mark Noferi, Cascading ConstitutionalDeprivation: The Right to Appointed

Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63
(2012); Maunica Sthanki, DeconstnictingDetention: Structural Impunity and the Need for an Intervention,
65 RUTGERs L. REv. 447 (2013); Whitney Chelgren, Note, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is
Unconstitutionalto Detain Immigrants Without ProceduralProtections,44 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 1477 (2011);
Sayed, supra note 5; Travis Silva, Note, Toward a ConstitutionalizedTheory of Immigration Detention, 31
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 227 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Kristen M. Jarvis Johnson, Fearingthe United States: Rethinking Mandatory Detention of
Asylum Seekers, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 589,594 (2007) ("This creates a paradoxical problem: Those who knock
on the door to the United States in search of a place of refuge are greeted with a welcome mat to the criminal
corrections system."); Donald Kerwin, Looking for Asylum, Suffering in Detention,28 HUM. RTS. 3,3 (2001)
(describing the "expedited removal" process for those that enter with false or no documents).
10. See, e.g., Krakauer, supra note 4, at 275 (illustrating Israeli detention of unwanted asylum-seekers);
Sayed, supra note 5, at 1836 (detailing U.S. detention of unwanted asylum-seekers).
11. Fiona McKay, A Return to the 'PacificSolution', 44 FORCED MIGR. REv. 24,24 (2013).
12. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 590-91 (describing the deportation process in the United States for
"defensive" asylum-seekers).
13. See Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A Proposalfor Ending the Unnecessary
Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 197, 199, 235-38 (1999) (outlining the steps taken to
reduce abuse of the asylum process).
14. See, e.g., Case C-61/11, El Dridi, 2011 E.C.R. 1-03015, para. 3 (noting that detention should only be
used to carry out removal procedures); Case C-357/09, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189, para. 6 (citing Article
15 for the proposition that detention requires removal proceedings); Baban v. Australia, Communication
No. 1014/2001, U.N. HUM. RTs. COMMLrEE, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC78/D/1014/2001, para. 7.2 (2003) (finding
that the prolonged detention violated the Convention).
15. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001).
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Godwin,1 6 though the majority based its reasoning in large part on the limited powers
of the judiciary in Australia in order to distinguish the contrary case law from other
jurisdictions." Moreover, a more recent Australia Federal Court decision has
appeared to limit the impact of Al-Kateb by holding that the Minister must consider
the impact of indefinite detention on a migrant before deciding to deny a visa to that
individual.18
It is not my purpose in this Article to re-examine the implications of detaining a
migrant who under applicable law would be deported and has no right to remain. My
interest here is in the detention of asylum-seekers who have a presumptive right to
remain because they have a right to pursue refugee protection. A government may
seek to deter the filing of false asylum claims, in which case it makes sense to screen
out (or screen in) those with non-abusive claims and to release them from detention.19
But such a focused procedure would not satisfy a government that wants to discourage
the arrival of asylum-seekers, even if their claims are valid.2 0 Such detention challenges
the general rule that detention of asylum-seekers should be tied to the individual
person's characteristics and situation.2' Instead, such policies focus on deterring
people who are not even parties to the proceedings.

II.

THE CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE OF DETERRENCE

Deterrence, when used in isolation, is an extreme utilitarian justification for the
of
State power to deprive individuals of liberty. This justification proposes that
use
person
should suffer a hardship in order to change the behavior of others. Like
one
extreme
utilitarian policy, deterrence is subject to the critique that it ignores the
any
rights of individuals in the pursuit of a supposed greater good. As a threshold matter,
deterrence as a rationale for confinement is most commonly associated with
imprisonment as a criminal punishment.2 Murderers may be sent to prison in part to
deter would-be murderers, but they are also personally deserving of punishment for
an immoral act. Thus, the impact on third parties (deterrence) is consistent with the

16. Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, para. 22 (Austl.).
17. Id. paras. 49-55.
18. See NBMZ v Ministerfor Immigration and Border Protection, [2014] FCAFC 38, para. 114 (Austl.)
(noting that there are some temporal limits on detention).
19. See Pistone, supra note 13, at 237 (arguing that deterrence should be limited to unmeritorious
claimants).
20. See, e.g., Michael D. Yanovsky Sukenik, Marginal Refuge: The Ramifications of Terrorism for an
Unsustainable United States Asylum Policy, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 86 (2010) (arguing that there is a
tension between the humanitarian interest in supporting grants of meritorious asylum claims and the reality
that - given the spread of global terrorism-there will soon be too many meritorious claims for the United
States to practically accept).
21. See, e.g., A v. Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, U.N. Doc.
CCPR!C/59/D/560/1993, paras. 9.3-9.4 (1997) (stating that detention of migrants should be tiod to individual
migrant's circumstances); see also Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights TreatiesMatter?: JudicialResponses to
the Detention of Asylum-Seekers in the United States and the United Kingdom, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
209, 241 (2015) (stating that the United States only detained individuals when deemed necessary, given said
individuals' threat-level and flight risk).
22. See Matthew Haist, Deterrence in A Sea of "JustDeserts": Arc UtilitarianGoals Achievable in A
World of "Limiting Retributivism"?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 796-97 (2009) (describing the
different ideas justifying the use of detention in criminal proceedings).
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moral culpability of the person.u By contrast, when governments detain asylumseekers, the element of moral culpability may be missing.2 4 Refugee status
determination, and even detention of asylum-seekers, is usually understood as a civil
or administrative matter.u This categorization is generally beneficial to governments
because it normally justifies fewer procedural safeguards than would be required in
criminal cases. In the context of American immigration law, Csar Cuauht6moc
Garcia HernAndez has recently explained why governments' insistence on the
deterrence rationale strengthens the argument that immigration detention is really a
form of punishment, not mere administrative processing.2 6 If refugee detention is
analogous to criminal punishment, then governments might need to revamp their
refugee procedures to meet the requirements of a fair criminal trial.
If governments insist on maintaining the non-criminal nature of immigration
enforcement, standard rationales for criminal incarceration are thus of limited
persuasive value to justify detaining asylum-seekers.
When asylum-seekers are detained, the question of whether an individual may be
made to suffer in pursuit of a broader goal is brought front and center. Asylum-seekers
are normally not prosecuted for any criminal act related to their entry.27 In fact, since
international law recognizes the right to seek asylum and the obligation of States to
281
not forcibly return genuine refugees, it is not at all clear that they have done anything
wrong. This is the paradox of refugee law that I noted in the introduction-asylumseekers and refugees may have done nothing wrong, and yet States believe it is
reasonable to try to dissuade others from following in their footsteps. Utilitarianism
in its extreme forms is willing to sacrifice individual liberty for the greater good. But
in this case it is not even completely clear that deterring asylum-seekers from seeking
asylum is a good at all.
It is important to note that even without a deterrence rationale, detention of
asylum-seekers may be justified in a number of different ways. The Refugee
Convention itself allows countries to deport a refugee-even to a country where she
would be persecuted-if she should pose a security threat. 29 The Convention also
allows a refugee to be punished for illegal entry, at least in certain narrow
circumstances.3 0 But these justifications for detention are rooted in the characteristics
or actions of an individual." A person may be punished for illegal entry as a routine

23. See id. at 805 (stating that "there are intuitive sensibilities about punishments" that lead to
"different levels of punishment").
24. See Sharon Pickering & Leanne Weber, New DeterrenceScripts in Australia'sRejuvenated Offshore
Detention Regime for Asylum Seekers, 29 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1006, 1013 (2014) (describing the arbitrariness
of the decision to transfer only some refugees, including children).
25. Hemndez, supra note 8, at 1351, 1353-54.
26. See id at 1392-93 (stating that "recogniz[ing] immigration detention as punishment... would
necessarily require changing how immigration law is enforced").
27. Chelgren, supra note 8, at 1495
28. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28,1951, 19 UST 6223, 189 U.N.T.S.
150.
29. Id. art. 33(2).
30. Id. art. 31(1).
31. See Krakauer, supra note 4, at 304 ("[D]etention can only be applied for a legitimate purpose in the
individual case.").
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criminal manner, if such action was not necessary to flee from a grave threat,3 2 or may
be detained if he would personally pose a security threat."
Detention that is based solely on individual characteristics is inherently limited
and offers the detained person an opportunity to challenge the detention.u A person
can contest whether she poses an actual national security threat, for example." In the
case of punishment for illegal entry, the Refugee Convention establishes a defense
against prosecution, providing that States "shall not impose penalties, on account of
their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened ... enter or are present in their territory without
authorization."36 Although under this provision States could punish illegal entrants,
including refugees, who choose to come solely for reasons of personal convenience,
the refugee condition is defined by fleeing from threats to life or freedom.37 Thus,
many or most refugees are likely to be able to invoke this defense.38 In the United
States, there is a general rule shielding asylum-seekers from having their manner of
entry held against them.39 Thus, if a State wishes to deter asylum-seekers from coming,
the mechanisms permitted by the Refugee Convention are unlikely to be satisfactory.
Governments also justify, or at least attempt to justify, detention of asylumseekers by failing to distinguish their situation from other unauthorized migrants.4
Since individualized characteristics do not justify detention on the scale that
governments may want, this strategy seeks to erect procedural obstacles for even
having individual characteristics correctly evaluated. One can see this strategy in the
Israeli asylum system, which has delayed or refused to conduct individual asylum
examinations of Eritrean and Sudanese migrants while simultaneously insisting that
they are economic migrants. But, as we will see, this procedural strategy did not fool
the High Court, which used the flaws in the government's asylum adjudication system
41

32. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 28, art. 31(1) (stating that a refugee's
life or freedom must be threatened to avoid liability).
33. Id. art. 9.
34. See, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, DETECTION GUIDELINES: GUIDELINES ON THE
APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND

.

ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION 25 (2012) ("[A]n individual has the right to challenge his or her detention
on [discriminatory] grounds. .
35. See id. at 19, 25 (establishing that a government's determination that an individual poses a national
security threat must still comply with non-discriminatory detention standards).
36. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 28, art. 31(1).
37. Adrian Edwards, UNHCR Viewpoint: 'Refugee' or 'Migrant'- Which is right?, UNHCR (Aug. 27,
2015), http://www.unhcr.org/55df0e556.html.
38. See id. (describing the differences between refugees and migrants and stating that refugees are
generally protected by the Refugee Convention).
39. See Questions and Answers: Asylum Eligibility and Applications, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-andSERVS.,
IMMIGRATION
answers-asylum-eligibility-and-applications (last updated Sept. 3, 2009) (stating that one can apply for
asylum "regardless of ... immigration status").
40. See, e.g., Krakauer, supra note 4, at 289, 294 (describing Israel's procedure for asylum applicants
from Eritrea and Sudan, notably the lack of basic and comprehensive asylum applicant interviews and its
insistence that African refugees are "simply economic migrants"); McKay, supra note 11, at 24 (explaining
that Australia's approach to refugees who arrive by boat is to "link these arrivals with illegal peoplesmuggling operations, with the individual asylum seekers characterized as 'illegal immigrants' who have
'jumped the queue' by arriving in Australia outside the formal UNHCR process").
41. Krakauer, supra note 4, at 289, 294.
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to cast doubt on the government's arguments.4 2 This procedural strategy does not
contest the basic principle that refugees have rights, but seeks to erect procedural
obstacles to prevent them from actually accessing their rights.
But deterrence is a wholly different kind of rationale. As a matter of substantive
law, it attempts to thwart claims that refugees and asylum-seekers have rights because
of their individual circumstances by suggesting that they can be detained anyway, so
as to send a message to others. 3 When a government argues that an asylum-seeker
should be detained in order to deter other asylum-seekers, the detention becomes
divorced from the conduct and characteristics of the person who is actually detained.
The government may concede, explicitly or implicitly, that the detained person poses
no threat to anyone. The government may even concede that she is likely to eventually
be granted refugee status. The purpose of deterrence is not tied to the person
detained, but rather to send a message to other people who are not even present. The
more that government is able to claim that the arrival of asylum-seekers is a bad thing,
the stronger its case will be for deterrence. But by the same token, deterrence-based
measures do not have a built-in limit. In fact, the theory of deterrence is that the more
severe the measure, the better." Thus, it can be difficult to strike a balance that
achieves proportionality. In short, how far can a government go to infringe the rights
of person A in order to send a message to person B?
4

In sum, when the government imposes harsh measures based solely on a
deterrence rationale, three sequential questions are presented as a matter of law:
Is deterrence ever legitimate as a stand-alone justification for infringing the rights
of asylum-seekers?
If deterrence is sometimes legitimate, is it valid as a general matter in migration
control, or is it limited to certain exceptional circumstances, such as migration of a
certain scale or situations where there is a bona fide national security threat as well?
When (if ever) deterrence is a legitimate goal, how far may governments go? Is
there any effective proportionality limit?
As we will see, these questions have been answered in different ways by
administrative and judicial bodies in the U.S. and Israel.

III.

THE UNITED STATES: MATTER OFD-J- AND
JOHNSON

R.LL-R v.

Detention of asylum-seekers who enter without authorization is a long-standing
problem in the United States. Under the normal procedure, asylum-seekers who enter
the country without permission or without valid documents are initially subject to

42. Gerry Simpson, "Make Their Lives Miserable": Israel's Coercion of Eritreanand SudaneseAsylum
Seekers to Leave Israel, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/09/maketheir-lives-miserable/israels-coercion-eritrean-and-sudanese-asylum-seekers.
43. See Michael Rowan, The Latest Chapterin the Saga of a Spiritless Law: DetainingHaitianAsylum
Seekers as a Violation of the Spirit and the Letter of International Law, 3 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 371, 395 (2003) (describing how Haiti's policy of detaining all asylum-seekers is to deter
future asylum seekers)
44. Kevin C. Kennedy, A CriticalAppraisalof CriminalDeterrence Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. 1,5 (1983)
(describing researcher opinion that "no punishment can deter unless the punishment is perceived as being
severe").
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DETERRENCE

mandatory detention, but may be released on parole or with bond if they pass a
"credible fear" interview, an initial step in the asylum process. 45
American
immigration law has well-established factors governing release on bond, principally
risk of flight and danger to the community. 6 Although an alien in removal proceedings
has no constitutional right to release on bond, denial of bail to an alien is only within
the Attorney General's lawful discretion where that denial has a "reasonable
foundation." 47 Where no reasonable foundation for denial of bond exists, the
Immigration Judge should release the alien from custody if she does not pose a danger
to other persons or to property in the United States and she "is likely to appear for
any scheduled proceeding or interview."" The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly
drawn a link between criminal pre-trial detention and immigration detention, since in
neither case has the detained person been found guilty of a crime. 9 As a result, the
detention cannot be justified as a form of punishment.o Importantly, risk of flight and
danger to public safety share a focus on the conduct and characteristics of the detained
person. They thus differ from general deterrence as a rationale for detention because
that rationale ignores individual factors.
4

Just over a year after the September 11 attacks, the Attorney General introduced
a new rationale for detaining asylum-seekers." On October 29, 2002, the Coast Guard
intercepted a boat carrying 216 would-be migrants from Haiti.5 2 Mr. D-J- attempted
to flee, but was caught.5 3 In his removal proceedings, he asked for asylum, and also
asked for release on bond while his case was pending.u. The Immigration Judge set a
relatively low bond-$2500-based on the assessment that he was not a flight risk or
a danger to the community." The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
(predecessor to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) objected that the judge
should have also considered the possibility that releasing D-J- would "stimulate
further surges of such illegal migration by sea and threaten important national security
interests."56 Overruling the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals,
Attorney General John Ashcroft sided with the INS:

45. Pistone, supra note 13, at 234.
46. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. §1226 (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(3)
(2015); see Patel, 15 I.&N. Dec. 666, 666-67 (B.I.A. 1976) (refusing to uphold even minimal bond of
immigrant who overstayed a student visa, as there was no risk that he would fail to appear at deportation
proceedings).
47. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1952) (referencing United States ex rel. Potash v. District
Director, 169 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1948)); see also United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director of INS,
491 F.2d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying the "reasonable foundation" standard to find that denial of bond
was warranted where the alien was a threat to national security).
48. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(3).
49. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001) (stating that civil detention, much like criminal
pretrial detention, requires adequate procedural protections and should be used in nonpunitive
circumstances).
50. See id. (finding that civil detention should be "nonpunitive in purpose and effect").
51. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES:
ARBITRARY UNDER THE ICCPR 9-10 (2007).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

D-J-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 572, 572 (A.G. 2003).
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
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I conclude that releasing respondent.. . on bond would give rise to adverse
consequences
for national
security
and
sound immigration
policy.... Encouraging such unlawful mass migrations is inconsistent with
sound immigration policy and important national security interests."
Ashcroft based his decision on a particularly insidious logic that associates
asylum-seekers like D-J- with terrorists, even though the government did not allege
(much less present evidence) that D-J- personally had anything to do with terrorists. 8
Although D-J- was himself apparently harmless, Ashcroft relied on the premise that
arrival of people like him drains resources that could be used to fight terrorism.59
Moreover, the State Department alleged that "aliens from countries such as Pakistan"
were trying to enter the United States from Haiti. 0 At the same time, the
government's strained resources in the "declared National Emergency" after 9/11
allegedly made individual screening impractical.
Matter of D-J- is based in part on the questionable premise that non-citizens
facing deportation do not have a right to release on bond.62 It is true that in 1952 the
Supreme Court did observe in passing that the American immigration statute makes
release on bond a matter of discretion, 6 but the court barely discussed the issue in that
case." More to the point, in the much more recent case of Zadvydas v. Davis, the
Court found that even deportable immigrants with serious criminal records have a
"liberty interest [that] is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to
whether ... the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially
permanent."" The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has extended Zadvydas to
establish a right to a bond hearing for lengthy pre-hearing detention of people facing
removal, even when the Immigration and Nationality Act imposes mandatory
detention. 6 The Attorney General appears to have severely undervalued the
constitutional importance of a non-citizen's liberty, which thus allowed a skewed
analysis in which detaining such people as a deterrence to others might more easily
appear proportional. The Attorney General also did not consider U.S. obligations
under the Refugee Convention, especially the Convention's Article 31, which limits
punishment for illegal entry and restrictions on refugees' free movement.67 In theory,

57. Id. at 579.
58. See D-J-, 23 I.&N. Dec. at 579-80 (discussing pro-terrorism effects of allowing alien asylum-seekers
to be released on bond).
59. Id. at 580.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 575 (citing Carlsonv. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952), for the proposition that the statute
gives the Attorney General discretion to grant bond rather than a right to be released).
63. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534.
64. See id. (noting in passing that the statute "does not grant bail as a matter of right").
65. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
66. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1143 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that Zadvydas requires a
bond hearing once pre order detention lasts beyond six months); Casas Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that prolonged detention while a respondent petitions in
federal court for review of a removal order requires a bond hearing). See generally Farrin R. Anello, Due
Processand Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363 (2014).
67. See generally Alicia Triche Naumik, InternationalLaw and Detention of US Asylum Seekers:
ContrastingMatter of D-J- with the United Nations Refugee Convention, 19 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 661 (2007).
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treaty obligations should impact the interpretation of any ambiguities in American
immigration statutes.
There was no direct appeal of the Attorney General's decision, leaving it as
binding administrative precedent for Immigration Judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals. 69 But there is little indication that the Department of Homeland
Security invoked Matter of D-J- again until 2014 when the United States experienced
a surge of migration from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala." Most of these
migrants were unaccompanied children or children traveling with their mothers who
were trying to escape rampant gang violence." The unaccompanied children were
typically released if a relative or custodian could be located in the United States.7 2 But
DHS detained the mothers and children, even after many of them passed a credible
fear interview, indicating that they had plausible asylum claims.73 The detainees then
asked immigration judges to release them on bond."
Asylum-seekers with no criminal records who pass a credible fear interview
normally make strong candidates for release on bond." DHS's own standards favor
release of asylum-seekers who can establish their identity, so long as an individualized
determination does not reveal a flight risk or danger to the community." In fact, in
2009 DHS issued policy guidance declares that "continued detention" after a favorable
credible fear determination is not "in the public interest." Nevertheless, DHS relied
on Matter of D-J- to argue against the release of the Central American women and
children in what became known as the "no bond, high bond" policy."
In Immigration Court, DHS submitted an affidavit from an ICE official
bolstering the claim that the women and children should be detained in order to deter
others from coming:
68. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 483 (1998) (arguing that when "'congressional
intent is ambiguous or absent,' applying the CharmingBetsy canon 'is the same as creating a rule that the
government regulatory scheme cannot violate international law') (quoting Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist
View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 675 (1986)).
69. See R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 175 (D.D.C. 2015) (stating that Matter ofD-J- is binding
precedent on ICE officials).
70. Id. at 175-76; see Kristina M. Campbell, A Dry Hate: White Supremacy and Anti-Immigrant
Rhetoric in the Humanitarian Crisis on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 117 W. VA. L. REv. 1081, 1114 (2015)
(explaining that the Obama administration opened a "deportation center" to quickly deport the mass influx
of immigrants from Central America using Matter of D-J- to remedy Fifth Amendment issues regarding the
"no-release-detention policy").
Children at the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://
71. Haeyoun Park, Q. and A.:
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/15/us/questions-about-the-border-kids.html.
72. Id.
73. Michelle Chen, This Honduran Mother Fled Death Threats Only to be Locked Up in the US,
NATION (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/articlc/this honduran mother-fled death threats only
to-be-locked-up-in-the-us; AILA's Take on Bond for Detained Families, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS
AsS'N (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.aila.org/infonet/ailas-take-on-bond-for-detained-families.
74. AILA's Take on Bond for Detained Families, supra note 73.
75. Jakc Dean, ImmigrantDetaineesin New Mexico DeniedRelease on Bond, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB
SITE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/09/26/immi-s26.html.
76. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF'T, DIRECTIVE NO. 11002.1, PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS
FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE para. 6.2 (2009)
77. Id.
78. Dean, supra note 75.
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Allowing detainees to bond out would have indirect yet significant adverse
national security consequences as it undermines the integrity of our
borders....

.

[T]he current detainees already are motivated ... by the belief that they
would receive release from detention. Validating this belief further
encourages mass migration, which only increases the already tremendous
strain on our law enforcement and national security agencies. .
Such a diversion of resources disrupts our ability to deal with other threats
to public safety, including national security threats."
The factual basis of this assertion was hotly disputed." DHS relied heavily on a
report written by Vanderbilt University professor Jonathan Hiskey, which DHS
believed supported the theory that release on bond incentivizes irregular migration by
Central Americans through Mexico to the United States." But Prof. Hiskey filed an
affidavit contending that DHS had distorted his research.82 DHS submitted a
declaration from one of its own officials expressing concern that the migrants are
transported by criminal smuggling gangs who often deprive them of food, water and
ventilation, steal their belongings, and threaten to kill them.8 DHS argued that this
explained why it is humane to deter migrants from trying to make the journey.8 But
lawyers for the migrants noted that it was implausible to suggest that rumors of low
bond decisions are more powerful inducements to migrate while factual reports of
armed robbery, forced starvation, and imminent death somehow have little deterrent
effect."
Bond decisions were initially made by Immigration Judges, and when mothers
and children secured a bond order, DHS often appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, arguing that low bond orders should be reviewed under the deterrence and
national security framework of Matter of D-J-."' It is important to understand that this
79. Declaration of Philip T. Miller, Assistant Director of ICE Field Operations, paras. 12-13 (Aug. 7,
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/imiigrantjustice.org/files/Government%20No%20Bond%20
2014),
Declarations.pdf [hereinafter Miller Declaration].
80. See Declaration of Jonathan Hiskey, Associate Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt
University, paras. 7-18 (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/hiskey-affidavit_
9.22.14_final.pdf (claiming that the Americas Barometer Report does not support the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS's) proposed detention policies) [hereinafter Hiskey Declaration].
81. See Miller Declaration, supra note 79, para. 11 (citing the Americas Barometer Report as support
for Miller's proposed detention policies).
82. Hiskey Declaration, supra note 80, paras. 7-18.
83. Declaration of Traci A. Lembke, Assistant Director over Investigative Programs for Homeland
Security Investigations, paras. 12-13 (Aug. 7, 2014), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/
files/Government%20No%2OBond%20Declarations.pdf.
84. See Miller Declaration, supra note 79, paras. 14-16 (claiming that stricter detention policies would
stymy illegal immigration and consequently defund violent human trafficking networks).
85. See Hiskey Declaration, supra note 80, paras. 16-17 (asserting that there is no empirical evidence
that U.S. detention policies influence the decisions of potential migrants).
86. See Daniel M. Kowalski, Unpub. BIA Bond Victory for Salvadoran Refugee Family at Karnes;
Matter of D-J- Distinguished, LExISNEXIS, Feb. 8, 2015, http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/
immigration/b/insidenews/archivc/2015/02/08/unpub-bia-bond-victory-for-salvadoran-rcfugcc-family-atkarnes-matter-of-d-j-distinguished.aspx (detailing the DHS appeal of a bond order made by an Immigration
Judge); see also D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 579-81 (A.G. 2003) (outlining the national security interests to be
considered in all bond proceedings).
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created complicated procedural constraints. The most natural argument for the
migrants would be that Matter of D-J- was wrongly decided, but as an administrative
tribunal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) cannot overrule a decision of the
Attorney General." Instead, in an unpublished decision issued in February 2015, the
BIA distinguished Matter of D-J- because of factual differences in the cases:
There are material distinctions between this matter and the facts presented
in Matter of D-J-. The alien in that case arrived in the United States
approximately one year after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as
part of an influx of seagoing migrants. He was among a group of aliens who
carried little or no identification and who attempted to evade coastal
interdiction and law enforcement authorities ashore. By contrast, the
respondents in these proceedings are a family unit from El Salvador who
entered the United States by crossing the southern border in July
2014 ... There is no evidence in the record that the respondents sought to
flee or escape the officers who apprehended them.m
The BIA thus avoided dealing directly with the deterrence and national security
issues and also avoided having to confront a decision by the Attorney General.
Matter of D-J- came under a more direct challenge via a case filed in the District
Court for the District of Columbia, known as R.LL-R v. Johnson."9 The Plaintiffs in
that case were mothers and children from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador who
had been found to have a credible fear, giving rise to asylum claims, but had been
denied release from detention." They sought an injunction against detaining them for
the purpose of deterring future migration to the United States, a policy that they
argued violated the right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.9' Unlike
the BIA, District Judge James Boasberg was free to review the constitutionality of the
no bond, high bond policy.9 If anything, the Matter of D-J- decision worked to the
advantage of the plaintiffs, because the existence of a binding administrative decision
helped to prove the existence of a systematic policy that a federal court could enjoin.93
In February 2015, around the same time as the BIA's unpublished decisions
distinguishing Matter of D-J-, Judge Boasberg issued a preliminary injunction against
using deterrence as a justification for detention." His decision attacked the validity of
deterrence directly, noting that the Supreme Court has only upheld justifications for
immigration detention that were based on characteristics of the person being
detained. But deterrence is something else:
95

87. See D-J-, 23 I.&N. Dec. at 573-74 (holding that the Attorney General has the authority to make
controlling determinations under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
88. Kowalski, supra note 86 (citation omitted).
89. See generally R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (2015).
90. Id. at 172.
91. Id. at 172-73.
92. See id. at 176-77 (explaining that because Plaintiffs "do not seek review of DHS's exercise of
discretion," but challenge whether DHS went beyond its constitutional discretion).
93. See id. at 185 (rejecting the government's argument the court lacks jurisdiction because no clear
policy exists).
94. Id. at 191.
95. R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 188.
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The Government here advances an entirely different sort of interest. It
claims that, in determining whether an individual claiming asylum should be
released, ICE can consider the effect of release on others not present in the
United States. Put another way, it maintains that one particular individual
may be civilly detained for the sake of sending a message of deterrence to
other Central American individuals who may be considering immigration."'
Judge Boasberg dismissed the claim that migrants harmed national security by
diverting resources away from national defense efforts, as the Attorney General had
found in Matter of D-J-.7
This succinct rejection of deterrence in immigration elegantly articulates the core
problem with deterrence, which also suggests some important unanswered questions.
Deterrence means imposing hardship on one person in order to influence another
person. In this case, it means detaining Person A in order to dissuade Person B from
trying to come to the United States. Deterrence of this kind is not unknown to the
law; it is a common rationale for criminal sanctions. It is thus interesting and possibly
important that Judge Boasberg specifies that the case involves people being "civilly
detained."" As I noted earlier in this Article, other commentators have noted that by
attempting to use immigration detention for deterrence purposes, the government
raised questions about whether immigration enforcement could be considered distinct
from criminal law for due process purposes.9
Judge Boasberg noted that even when States take measures against the mentally
ill or violent sex offenders, there is an underlying finding that "those being deterred
are ... wrongdoers."' 0 If deterrence alone could justify detention, the police could
detain a child to deter behavior on the part of a parent, or detain a person simply to
deter his or her spouse. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has analogized
immigration detention to pre-trial criminal detention, noting that punishment (and
thus, presumably, deterrence) cannot be a justification because there has been no
finding of guilt."' Thus, if deterrence can justify post-conviction criminal punishment,
even in that context it is only a partial justification. There must be an individualized,
underlying finding of moral culpability as well. By contrast, people fleeing from
violence "may have legitimate claims to asylum in this country."'0 2
For now, it seems that the U.S. government may be retreating in the battle over
On June 24, 2015, the Secretary of
deterrence-based immigration detention.
Homeland Security announced that DHS would relax its aggressive detention policy
for families arriving from Central America."o3 Among several changes in detention
96. Id. at 188-89.
97. See id. at 189 ("The simple fact that increased immigration takes up government resources cannot
necessarily make its deterrence a matter of national security, with all the attendant deference such
characterization entails.").
98. See id. at 189 (stating that there is no logical reason to include an immigration carve-out to the
general rule that deterrence solely applies in the criminal, not civil, context)
99. See, e.g., HernAndez, supra note 8, at 1353-57 (noting that the Supreme Court has classified
immigration detention as a civil matter without explanation, but that this has been blurred by the use of
deportation and detention).
100. R.I.R-L, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189.
101. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987).
102. R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189.
103. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Family
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policy, Secretary Johnson said, "[W]e have discontinued invoking general deterrence
as a factor in custody determinations in all cases involving families.", The preliminary
injunction in R.LL-R may become the last word from the courts on the deterrence
issue, if indeed the DHS change in policy rendered it unnecessary for the court to issue
a final judgment in the case. However, DHS has not entirely abandoned deterrence;
Secretary Johnson's statement applied only to family detention and was promised on
the fact that the number of new arrivals declined significantly in 2015.10' Thus, by
implication, deterrence might be invoked again in the case of a future migrant influx.
Moreover, Matter of D-J- remains on the books, at least technically." But it is clear
that DHS faced significant resistance in applying it from both the Board of
Immigration Appeals and from at least one federal judge.1 7 We do not know if other
federal judges would have seen the issue differently; perhaps DHS could win in a
different court with different jurists. But it is also possible that Matter of D J is a kind
of zombie decision-a valid administrative precedent on paper that has not been
directly reversed or vacated, but is effectively without any real remaining force. 1s
IV.

ISRAEL: ADAM AND EITAN

Deterrence-based migrant detention has not reached an appellate court in the
United States, but it has been the focus of two major decisions by the Israeli High
Court of Justice.l" While the American Department of Homeland Security retreated
from its aggressive assertion of deterrence detention within about a year, in Israel the
issue has produced a nearly unprecedented level of constitutional brinksmanship."o
Indeed, this is why there are two cases -and there could be more in the future. Despite
remarkable political pressure, the Israeli High Court has twice struck down laws
imposing mass detention on asylum-seekers.
By way of background, from 2008 until 2013 Israel experienced a massive surge
in asylum-seekers arriving through its border with Egypt. In total, about 65,000
asylum-seekers arrived during this period, the vast majority of them from Eritrea and
Sudan, two countries with well-documented and large-scale human rights problems."'
Israel's official reaction has been something short of welcoming. Israeli Prime
Minister Benyamin Netanyahu said, "[I]f we don't stop the problem, 60,000 infiltrators
are liable to become 600,000, and cause the negation of the State of Israel as a Jewish
Residential Centers (June 24, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-cjohnson-family-residential-centers [hereinafter Johnson Statement].
104. Id.
105. Id.; see also R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (rejecting DHS's argument that deterrence is a
justification for detention).
106. See R.I.LR, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (distinguishing precedent established in Matter of D J); Kowalski,
supra note 86 (discussing the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA's) resistance to precedent established in
Matter of D-J-).
107. See R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (holding that migration is not necessarily a national security
concern); see also Kowalski, supra note 86 (making their decision while distinguishing Matter of D-J-).
108. See, e.g., Kowalski, supra note 107 (reporting that the judges virtually ignored Matter of D-J-).
109. HCJ 7385/13 Eitan - Israeli Immigration Policy Ctr. v. Israeli Gov't 1, 44 (2014) (Isr.); HCJ 7146/12
Adam v. Knesset 1, 3-4 (2013) (Isr.).
110. Johnson Statement, supra note 103; Eitan v. Israeli Gov't, HCJ 7385/13 at 190-91; Adam v. Knesset,
HCJ 7146/12 at 3-4.
111. Adam v. Knesset, HCJ 7146/12 at 2-6.
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and democratic state."H 2 In 2012, Israel's Interior Minister said: "We don't need to
import more problems from Africa.... Most of those people arriving here are
Muslims who think the country doesn't belong to us, the white man... .. "n' By early

2014, Israel had granted asylum to only two Eritreans out of 36,000 in the country,
while the United States has approved Eritrean asylum requests at a rate of

approximately 90 percent.11 4 The legal limbo imposed on Eritrean and Sudanese
asylum-seekers has been explored elsewhere."' The focus here is the fact that, in an
effort to deter them, Israel has made use of mass detention.116
For anyone committed to the cause of refugee protection, Israel's reaction to the
arrival of asylum-seekers -its reluctance to grant bona fide asylum, its systemic use of
detention, and its leaders' bombastic, racially-tinged, anti-immigrant rhetoric-has
been appalling."' Moreover, the numbers of Eritrean and Sudanese asylum-seekers
in Israel are miniscule compared to the numbers of Syrian refugees being hosted by

Israel's neighbors."'8 Lebanon, which has a smaller population than Israel, hosts 1.1
million Syrian refugees. 9 But, in an effort to put matters as sympathetically to Israel
as possible, Israel is a small country, about forty times smaller than the United States

by population.1'

An influx of 65,000 asylum-seekers over five years would likely

produce a negative reaction from many governments. We have seen already the
draconian measures that the U.S. government took in response to an arrival of roughly
the same number of Central Americans in 2013-2014.121 But the United States is much

112. Talila Nesher, Netanyahu: Israel Could Be Overrun by African Infiltrators, HAARETZ (May 21,
2012, 1:01 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-israel-could-be-overrun-byafrican-infiltrators-1.431589.
113. Allyn Fisher-Ilan, Israel to Jail Illegal Migrants for up to Three Years, REUTERS, June 3, 2012,
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFBRE8520DX20120603.
114. See Ilan Lior, Two EritreansGranted Refugee Status in Rare Decision, HAARETZ (Jan. 27,2014, 1:08
AM), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.570737 (noting that only two of the 1800 asylum
requests had been granted); U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2011:
TRENDS IN DISPLACEMENT, PROTECTION AND SOLUTIONS 102 (2013) (showing that almost ninety percent
of requests had been granted).
115. See generally Reuven Ziegler, No Asylum for 'Infiltrators'. The Legal Predicamentof Eritreanand
Sudanese Nationals in Israel, 29 IMMIGR., ASYLUM & NAT'LITY L. 172 (2015).
116. Refugees, HOTLINE FOR REFUGEES & MIGRANTS, http://hotline.org.illen/refugees-and-asylumseekers-en/ (last visited July 9, 2014).
117. See Simpson, supra note 42 ("Israel's policies are well summed up in the words of former Israeli
Interior Minister Eli Yishai who said that as long as Israel cannot doport them to their home countries, it
should 'lock them up to make their lives miserable."').
118. See Syria's Refugee Crisis in Numbers, AMNESTY INT'L (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latect/news/2016/02/yriao refugee crisis in numbers/ (stating that more than
4.5 million refugees are in just five countries).
119. See The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.htmi (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (showing that Lebanon has a
population of about six million, while Israel has a population of eight million); Syria's Refu gee Crisis in
Numbers, supra note 118 (stating that Lebanon hosts around 1.1 million refugees).
120. See The World Factbook, supra note 119 (showing that Israel has a population of about 8 million,
while the United States has about 321 million people).
121. See, e.g., Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central American
Migrants to Their Deaths, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/
obama-immigration-deportations-central-america (detailing how the U.S. deportation practices for
undocumented immigrants have negativoly impacted come individuals once they return home to Central
America).
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bigger. Per capita, the arrival of 65,000 newcomers to Israel would be the equivalent
of 2.6 million people coming to the United States.1
Israel's most effective reaction to the influx has arguably been the construction
of a barrier or wall on its southern border.'2 The completion of a 245-kilometer barrier
precipitated a near-total end to the large-scale influx; by 2013 fewer than a dozen
migrants were arriving each month.1 24 Nevertheless, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament)
also enacted a measure providing for "infiltrators" to be detained at a special facility
in Israel's southern desert for three years." Although Israel has not usually granted
asylum to the Eritreans and Sudanese, it followed a policy of not deporting them in
most cases, especially Eritreans. 1 26 As a result, the State could not argue that the
detention was justified by a need to facilitate deportation. ' Instead, the State offered
two purposes for the legislation. ' First,
12

to prevent the infiltrators from settling in Israel and to enable the state to
address the broad ramifications of the phenomenon of infiltration. The state
notes that the law seeks to prevent infiltrators who have already penetrated
the borders of the State of Israel from setting down roots and settling
therein, thereby positioning their illegal immigration as an accomplished
fact.129
The second purpose was deterrence:
The goal is formulated by the state as blocking the phenomenon of
infiltration.... [T]he significance of this purpose in the context of the
amendment of the law is deterrence. That is, the act of placing the
infiltrators in detention deters potential infiltrators from coming to Israel
since they realize that they, too, will be placed in custody.130
In a unanimous decision,'"' the Israeli High Court expressed significant
reservations about deterrence. The lead opinion by Justice Edna Arbel noted-just
like Judge Boasberg in R.LL-R-that deterrence means depriving one person of
liberty in order to impact the behavior of another person.'32 In Justice Arbel's phrase,
borrowing from Emmanuel Kant: "The person is regarded not as a goal but as a
means."1 33 Quoting previous High Court jurisprudence, she wrote that human heings

122. See The World Facibook, supia note 119 (showing the differences in population size between the
two countries).
123. See HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. Knesset 1, 69 (2013) (Isr.) (tracking the decline of infiltrators as the wall
was constructed).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 23.
126. Id. at 9.
127. See id. at 16-17 (explaining that the right to detain is ancillary to the right to deport).
128. Id. at 57-58.
129. Adam v. Knesset, HCJ 7146/12 at 57.
130. Id. at 58-59.
131. All nine juistivev on itt panel found that the fsuee yars of detention violated Israel's Basic Lau
Human Dignity. One justice would not have invalidated the legislation, however. Id. at 150.
132. Id. at 59.
133. Id.
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have intrinsic value, and thus may not be treated as "mere means or as a negotiable
commodity."'"
She noted that detention of asylum-seekers was particularly
problematic because it was not punishment for a crime." The court thus appeared
ready to hold that "it is doubtful whether this purpose may be considered a fit one."'36
But the court did not quite reach that holding.'
Despite a lengthy critique of
deterrence in the Adam decision, the court held open the possibility that deterrence
might be valid "in an extreme situation."'m Justice Arbel, writing for the court, wrote:
"I am willing to adopt the assumption that the law passes the fit purpose test and to
examine it in accordance with the requirement of proportionality."'3 9
Rather than rule directly on the deterrence question, the High Court rested on
its conclusion that the detention was not proportional.140 In Adam, the Court noted
that only a small minority of the asylum-seekers were actually detained, so the
deprivation of liberty could not be reasonably expected to actually prevent most of
them from integrating with Israeli society. 4 ' As for deterrence, the success of the new
barrier at the Egyptian border at reducing the flow of migrants indicated that detention
was not the "least injurious means" to prevent migration.14
After Adam, the Knesset re-enacted a very similar detention regime targeting
Eritrean and Sudanese asylum-seekers, but with a new maximum period of one year
in detention."' This led to a new test in the High Court in Eitan v. Israel.'" This time,
the government managed to attract two dissenting justices to its cause, but the result
was the same in a 6-3 decision. 4 5 Justice Uzi Vogelman, writing for the court, followed
the analytical framework in Adam.'" He wrote that in the abstract, detention of
asylum-seekers could be justified for a period of time necessary to verify identity and
assess prospects for deportation.'4 7 But, as in Adam, the court understood that the
government's policy was to not deport most of the detainees.'" Justice Vogelman
understood that the real goal for the law was not deportation or individual case
assessment: "I think that simply put the purpose is to deter." 14 9 He referenced and
endorsed Justice Arbel's critique of deterrence in Adam."o But, just as the court did
in the earlier case, Justice Vogelman avoided a definitive rejection of deterrence, and
held instead that the detention failed on the proportionality test.'

134. Adam v. Knesset, HCJ 7146/12 at 59.
135. Id. at 61.
136. Id. at 62.
137. Id. at 64-65.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 65.
140. Adam v. Knesset, HCJ 7146/12 at 75-76, 82.
141. Id. at 67-68.
142. Id. at 71-72.
143. HCJ 7385/13 Eitan - Israeli Immigration Policy Ctr. v. Israeli Gov't 1, 5-6 (2014) (Isr.).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 215.
146. Id. at 6.
147. Id. at 36-37.
148. See id. at 38 (noting that the principal purpose seems to be deterrent, rather than the deportation
of that specific individual).
149. Eitan v. Israeli Gov't, HCJ 7385/13 at 38.
150. Id.
151. Id. ("I am willing to avoid setting rules in this matter regarding the purpose, due to the reason
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It is clear from Adam and Eitan that the Israeli justices perceive deterrence to be
a problematic justification for immigration detention, for reasons very similar to those
articulated by Judge Boasberg in the analogous American case. But it is worth noting
their evident hesitation to rest on this analysis. To do so would have imposed clearer
restrictions on the State. Instead, under the proportionality test, the State is invited to
try to devise a less injurious means of achieving its objective.15 2 This is in a sense
counterintuitive; presumably, deterrence is best achieved by harsh measures, but harsh
measures pose a greater problem in terms of being proportional. The court leaves
intact a potentially far-reaching rationale for draconian State action, while also acting
to limit the severity of any measures that might result. But this may also be explicable
simply as a form of judicial restraint; the court does not completely shut the door on
the legislature because it does not have to.
CONCLUSION
In Part II, I suggested that three sequential questions arise whenever a
government justifies detention on the basis of deterrence. The first, and potentially
decisive question, is whether deterrence is ever a legitimate, stand-alone justification
for detention. The American district court in R.I. L-R answered this decisively in the
negative, rendering the other follow up questions moot.153 However, this was only a
district court, and only in a preliminary injunction decision at that. For the Israeli High
Court, the lead opinions in Adam and Eitan strongly critiqued deterrence, suggesting
an inclination similar to the court in R.I.L-R. But the Israeli High Court declined in
both cases to hold that deterrence is illegitimate, leaving this question formally
unresolved as a matter of law. 5 Thus, these cases indicate judicial resistance to
deterrence, but they may not be enough to prevent governments in the United States
or Israel from trying again in the future.
4

The next question is whether deterrence is valid generally in migration control,
or only in certain situations. The former seems to be the approach offered by the
American Attorney General's decision in Matter of D-J-, at least as it has been applied
in unpublished decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals."' However, there is
reason for caution and concern about this conclusion. As we saw in Part III, Matterof
D-J- arose in the immediate aftermath of September 11 and involved a specific
migration flow about which the government invoked national security concerns.1 6 The
Attorney General did not closely scrutinize the connection between the Haitian man
at issue in the case and actual security threats."' The core of the government's national

that ... [the law] does not fulfill the proportionality tests . . . .").
152. Id. at 18-19 (summarizing the three-step proportionality test, which focuses on "the measures taken
in order to realize the purpose").
153. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining that general deterrence is an
impermissible justification for detention).
154. See HCJ 7385/13 Eitan - Israeli Immigration Policy Ctr. v. Israeli Gov't 1, 38 (2014) (Isr.) (deciding
oni giounds of psoportionality and noting that "an accompanying deterrent effect" would certainly be
permitted).
155. See, e.g., Kernand Pierre, File No. A200 042 972, 2007 WL 1724883 (B.I.A. May 22, 2007)
(describing how an immigration judge erred because the case was not distinguishable from Matter of 0-1-)
156. D-J-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 572, 577 (A.G. 2003).
157. Kemand Pierre, 2007 WL 1724883, at *2.
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security argument was simply that D-J-'s arrival diverted government resources from
the War on Terror.15 ' This framework could label anything that imposes costs on the
government as a national security threat. It is thus interesting that the BIA has seemed
eager to tighten the linkage with specific national security emergencies, emphasizing
individualized factors such as whether the asylum-seeker sought to elude border
police.'" 9 But Matter of D-J- remains on the books, and the BIA decisions limiting its
application are unpublished.
The last question is about proportionality, or how far the government can go in
the name of deterrence. This is the question that the Israeli High Court answered most
directly, holding first that three years of detention is disproportionate (Adam), and
then that one year of detention is also too much (Eitan).6 o While these holdings are
clear, they are also inherently limited since they invite the legislature to test the court
with a new policy that is in some manner less severe. Eventually, it stands to reason,
the Kiiesset may arrive at a set of measures that are mild enough didL (l- COuIt will
consider them proportional. But we do not know that this is how the Court will
eventually rule. If the State proceeds to test milder and milder policies, it risks falling
into two additional traps. On the one hand, if the State finds a policy that passes the
proportionality test, the Court could simply decide to rest its decision on the general
invalidity of deterrence, on which it has already made its views known. Thus, this
process of testing may in fact be a mask of judicial restraint by which the Court has
based its holding on the most narrow possible analysis, but it has actually not left the
State any real room to maneuver.16 ' On the other hand, once the State abandons the
most severe forms of detention, it faces a question of whether other measures would
actually carry any deterrence power anyway. The High Court may have placed the
State into a trap. The measures most likely to deter asylum-seekers are least likely to
be proportional, while measures more likely to be proportional are less likely to deter,
and thus may not be justified by deterrence anyway.
My main point is that the state of the law in the United States and Israel may
invite governments to try anew with deterrence, but they confront a resistant judiciary.
It is thus relevant to note one other course they may take. The cases that I have
examined here have all been rooted in a civil, administrative context, and the courts
have noted the non-criminal nature of the adjudication. I have argued that deterrence
is problematic outside the criminal context because there is no individualized finding
of moral culpability. If governments are resolute in their desire to deter migration, the
clearest route may be to treat asylum-seekers as criminals by prosecuting them for
illegal entry. To be clear: This would likely be illegal under international law, as it
would clash with the Refugee Convention's article 31, which forbids punishment for
illegal entry for refugees "coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom
was threatened."' 62 But this provision is of course potentially fraught with ambiguity.
Do Eritreans face enough hardship in Egypt to be able to claim the benefit of this

158. D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 579.
159. See Kernand Pierre, 2007 WL 1724883, at *1 (stating that the respondent's circumstances under
arrival demonstrated that respondent was seeking to evade immigration inspoction).
160. HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. Knesset 1, 99 (2013) (Isr.); HCJ 7385/13 Eitan - Israeli Immigration Policy
Ctr. v. Israeli Gov't 1, 210 (2014) (Isr.).
161. See Eitan v. Israeli Gov't, HCJ 7385/13 at 215 (stating that the State requires reflections and
restraint).
162. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 28, art. 31.
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defense to prosecution? What about Guatemalans who cross through Mexico? Article
31 is framed as an affirmative defense in criminal law, and just like other defenses of
necessity, an aggressive prosecutor could argue that it must be interpreted narrowly.
The point is that this is a long war. The governments of the United States and
Israel have essentially lost some significant battles in their attempt to use deterience
to justify detention of asylum-seekers. But the war is not over.

NB: After this Article was drafted, the Is? aeli High Court issued a third deti iun
on a third iterationof the Israelilegislation detainingasylum-seekers who enter over the
Egyptian border.163 I have not been able to review a complete English translationof the
decision, but it appearsfrom a detailedanalysispublished by Dr. Reuven Zigler that the
High Court approved detention up to twelve months, but found that detention beyond
that would be disproportional.'" This holding appears to represent a retreat by the
Court. It appearsconsistent with my observation in this Article that a proportionalityfocused analysis invites the state to continue testing incrementally milder measures until
it finds a formula thatpasses muster with the court. The Court appearedto continue its
pattern of sidestepping the deterrencequestion, although the justices continued to express
doubts about the propriety of deterrence.16 ' As Zigler noted, if the Courthad focused on
the improper deterrentpurpose rather than proportionality, most of the analysis-and
perhapsthe need to have three decisions- would have been avoided.'6 Moreover, in the
previous two cases one could explain the Court's avoidance of deterrence as a form of
judicial restraint,since the Court did not need to reach that question to justify its holding.
But since in this third case the Courtfound the government's measures proportionalto
the State's asserted purposes, it was more essential for the Court to scrutinize whether
the State's stated purposes were genuine and legitimate.

163. For background on the latest legislation, see Reuven Ziglor, Detention of African Asylum Seekers
in Israel: Welcome to Round Three, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/
articles/detention-of-african-asylum-seekers-in-israel-welcome-to-round-three/.
164. See Reuven Ziglor, In the Land of Hidden Legislative Aims: HCJ 8665/14 (Detention of Asylum
Seekers in Israel- Round 3), VERSA (Sept. 4, 2015), http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/viewpoints/land-hiddenlegislative-aims-hcj-866514-detention-asylum-seekers-israel-round-3.
165. See id. ("The main opinion notes that the pimary legislative goals as stipulated by the state aie to
enable state authorities to verify the identity of "infiltrators" and give them time to pursue avenues for
voluntary departure or expulsion of "infiltrators" from Israel. The Court considered these goals proper
notwithstanding the fact that the state had supplemented them with a general deterrence purpose.... In
other words, according to President Naor, while deterrence would not be accepted as the primary legislative
goal, it is constitutionally permissible to legislate with deterrence (also) in mind.").
166. Id. ("Notably, had the Justices accepted the petitioners' claim regarding the covert legislative goal,
it would have rendered the rest of the constitutional analysis superfluous a law enacted for an improper
purpose is unconstitutional.").

